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THE IARC MONOGRAPHS PROGRAM AND THE
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT—NEVER
THE TWAIN SHALL MEET?
DAVID B. FISCHER*
INTRODUCTION
At the eighteenth World Health Assembly1 meeting in Geneva in
1965, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (“IARC”) was voted
into being.2 This significant achievement was spearheaded by the United
States and a mere handful of other countries,3 all of whom agreed to annual contributions of $150,000 and to serve on the Governing Council.4
IARC has since grown to have twenty-seven participating states,5 and
*

David B. Fischer, M.P.H., JD, currently serves as the Deputy Assistant Administrator
for EPA’s Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention (OCSPP). He received a BA
in Biochemistry and Molecular Biology from Northwestern University, an M.P.H. from
the University of North Carolina School of Public Health, and a JD, with honors, from
the University of Maryland School of Law, where he focused on environmental law. Mr.
Fischer is also a patent lawyer. The author thanks Galen Rende for his stellar research
in the preparation of this Article. This work is not a product of the United States Government or the United States Environmental Protection Agency. The author is not doing
this work in any governmental capacity. The views expressed are his own and do not
necessarily represent those of the United States or the U.S. EPA.
1
The World Health Assembly is the governing body of the World Health Organization
(“WHO”). See Walter Davis, IARC: 20 years old, WORLD HEALTH, Mar. 1986, at 28.
2
Id. IARC in turn is part of the much larger Geneva, Switzerland-based WHO.
3
Id.
4
Id. The founding states included the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Northern
Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Id. IARC also included a Scientific Council and a
Secretariat. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, EIGHTEENTH WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY GENEVA PART II, PLENARY MEETINGS,
VERBATIM RECORDS, COMMITTEES MINUTES AND REPORTS, NO. 144, at 640 (May 4–21,
1965), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/85781/Official_record144_eng.pdf
?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/E3H7-KV9Q]; see also IARC, STATUTE, RULES
AND REGULATIONS 7 (May 2014), http://governance.iarc.fr/ENG/Docs/Statute_2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4TGR-69WC]. IARC is governed by a Governing Council, which is populated by representatives of each participating state and establishes IARC policy. Neil
Pearce et al., IARC Monographs: 40 Years of Evaluating Carcinogenic Hazards to Humans,
123 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 507, 511 (2015).
5
Membership, IARC, https://www.iarc.fr/en/about/membership.php [https://perma.cc/N5
PU-WZWM] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019). The current member states include the United
States, France, Germany, Italy, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, India, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Morocco, Norway, the Netherlands, Qatar, Republic

531

532

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 44:531

each of their assessed annual contributions vary depending in part on
“national resources.”6 Although IARC is part of the World Health Organization (“WHO”), it was envisioned from its inception to have significant autonomy.7
The involvement of the U.S. federal government in IARC, beyond its
inception, has been steadfast and indispensable, especially with regard to
IARC’s Monographs Program (“the Program”), established in 1971 to address the growing need for cancer classifications of chemicals and other
agents.8 For decades, the United States, primarily through the National
Cancer Institute (“NCI”),9 has provided the bulk of funding for the
Program—tens of millions of dollars to date, a sum that continues to
grow each year.10
Although it remains a relatively small part of the much larger
IARC, the Monographs Program’s diminutive size belies its global impact.
Monographs, developed by so-called working groups, often generate worldwide media interest,11 along with “confusion, controversy, and criticism,”12
of Korea, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Hungary,
and Turkey. Id.
6
IARC, REPORT OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL WORKING GROUP AMENDMENT OF METHOD
OF ASSESSMENT, FIFTEENTH SESSION 1 (Apr. 29–30, 1976), https://www.iarc.fr/wp-con
tent/uploads/2018/07/annexe2GC51_9.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8FT-WDU7]; see Funding,
IARC, https://www.iarc.fr/about-iarc-funding-assessed-contributions/ [https://perma.cc
/QG6Z-4PRG] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019). Member states are classified into one of five
Groups; Member states in Group 1, which contains both the United States and Japan,
pay the highest assessment, approximately $2M each year. The U.S. State Department
is responsible for paying the annual assessment to IARC. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION: DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS,
AND RELATED PROGRAMS, FY 2019 56 (2019), https://www.state.gov/documents/organi
zation/277155.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RQP-7ZKC].
7
See Davis, supra note 1, at 28 (noting that IARC was to be run by a separate Governing
Council).
8
See id. at 28–29. See generally NIH, NOTICE OF AWARD, GRANT NO. 2U01CA033193-34
(Sept. 10, 2015), https://eelegal.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/CA033193-34-redacted
_Redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QTB-EAKP] [hereinafter GRANT APPLICATION].
9
The NCI is one of over two dozen institutes and centers that constitute the National
Institutes of Health. See List of NIH Institutes, Centers, and Offices, NIH, https://www
.nih.gov/institutes-nih/list-nih-institutes-centers-offices [https://perma.cc/NK7R-S72P]
(last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
10
See Pearce et al., supra note 4, at 509. See generally GRANT APPLICATION, supra note 8.
11
See GRANT APPLICATION, supra note 8, at 80 (“For selected Monographs covering agents
of broad concern or outstanding importance to public health, press conferences are
organized. Press releases are distributed to more than 4000 key mainstream and scientific
media outlets worldwide . . . .”).
12
Kai Kupferschmidt, High-Profile Cancer Reviews Trigger Controversy, 352 SCI. 1504,
1504 (2016).
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as evidenced by the Program’s 2015 decision to classify glyphosate—the
most widely used herbicide in the world—as “probably carcinogenic” to humans.13 This unprecedented decision ignited not only a global reexamination of glyphosate’s safety, but also provided a potent new weapon to both
champions and detractors of the Program.14 After all, no other scientific
body had ever deemed glyphosate a carcinogen.15
13

Id.
In November 2015, just a few months after the IARC Monographs Program issued its
monograph on glyphosate, the European Food Safety Authority (“EFSA”) published its own
assessment of glyphosate. But, unlike IARC, the “EFSA concluded that glyphosate is unlikely
to pose a carcinogenic hazard to humans . . . .” Conclusion on the Peer Review of the Pesticide
Risk Assessment of the Active Substance Glyphosate, 13 EFSA J. 4302, 4302 (2015).
Shortly after the EFSA published its assessment, Dr. Chris Portier—who had served
on the IARC glyphosate working group, while he was also a consultant with the Environmental Defense Fund—“banded together” with scores of other scientists in a letter to
Vytenis Andriukaitis, Commissioner of Health & Food Safety for the European Commission,
to discredit the EFSA report and to tout the credibility of the IARC Working Group’s conclusion that glyphosate is a probable human carcinogen. Letter from Dr. Christopher J.
Portier et al. to Vytenis Andriukaitis (Nov. 27, 2015), https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/press
/news/160113 [https://perma.cc/ZW85-9A8W] [hereinafter Portier et al. Letter] (“We reviewed these two differing decisions on the human carcinogenicity of glyphosate and
conclude that the IARC WG decision is by far the more credible.”).
In a January 2016 response to Portier et al., Bernhard Url, the EFSA’s Executive
Director, pointed to the different evidence and the different methodologies as playing a
role in explaining the divergences between the IARC’s and the EFSA’s assessments of the
carcinogenic potential of glyphosate. Letter from Bernhard Url to Christopher J. Portier
(Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/press/news/160113 [https://perma.cc/B6BQ
-9YGV]. Url also underscored the EFSA’s open and transparent process. Id. Although the
letter mentions a forthcoming meeting between EFSA and IARC to exchange views, the
meeting was never held.
Christopher Wild, the former head of IARC, had his own quarrel with EFSA. In his missive to Url, Wild raised concerns with EFSA’s “misrepresentations of the IARC Monographs
on the EFSA website and in distributed materials.” Letter from Christopher P. Wild to
Bernhard Url (Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/press/news/160113 [https://
perma.cc/4NBF-68HA]. Even in the wake of IARC’s unprecedented glyphosate decision, Wild
heralded the IARC Monographs Program “as an authoritative standard for cancer hazard
assessment around the world,” and that “[t]ransparency, openness and scientific independence are assured throughout the evaluation process.” Id. In the February 5th letter,
Wild demanded that Url correct what Wild believed were factual errors “on the EFSA
website and in distributed materials” before a planned joint meeting could take place between the EFSA and IARC. Id. In a February 9th response to Wild, Url countered that the
parties should meet first and only then would Url commit “to correct any factual mistakes
about IARC on our website should these remain.” Letter from Bernhard Url to Christopher
J. Wild (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/press/news/160113 [https://perma
.cc/4NBF-68HA]. The parties were unable to bridge the divide and never met.
15
In Defense of Scientific Integrity: Examining the IARC Monograph Programme and
14
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Champions could wield the glyphosate cancer classification as a
sword to thwart glyphosate’s continued use, especially in the European
Union.16 For detractors, the glyphosate cancer classification served as a
quintessential example of the Program’s persistent deficiencies, some of
which were showcased at a February 2018 House Science Committee hearing.17 Although IARC touts the Program’s transparency and openness, the

Glyphosate Review: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., 115th Cong.
(Feb. 6, 2018) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm.
On Sci., Space & Tech.) (“The Monograph Programme is alone in its determination that
glyphosate poses a cancer threat. Both the EPA and EFSA, a European regulatory agency,
have reviewed glyphosate and determined that the chemical is unlikely to cause cancer.”);
accord Letter from Congressmen Lamar Smith, H.R. Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech. & Andy
Biggs, H.R. Subcomm. on Env’t, to Christopher J. Wild, IARC Director, at 2 (Nov. 1, 2017),
http://governance.iarc.fr/ENG/Docs/CLSBiggs-IARC_01112017.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5
NH-CS3U] [hereinafter Smith & Biggs Letter] (noting that IARC was “the only agency
to characterize glyphosate as ‘probably’ a carcinogen”); see also Hearing, supra (testimony
of Anna B. Lowit, EPA) (“IARC’s conclusion is inconsistent with the international community, where the EPA’s conclusion that glyphosate is ‘not likely to be carcinogenic to humans,’
is consistent with other countries and international organizations including: Australia
(2013), Canada (2015), Japan (2016), New Zealand (2016), the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) (2015), Germany (2014), the European Chemicals Agency and the Joint
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)/WHO Meeting on Pesticide Residues (JMPR) (2016).”). See generally Glyphosate: Some facts about Glyphosate,
EUROPA, https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides/glyphosate_en [https://perma.cc/FA
Q7-2B6T] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019). In light of previous governmental risk assessments
of glyphosate, it is unclear why IARC opted to conduct a more narrowly focused hazard
assessment on what is without question a well-studied chemical. Hearing, supra (testimony of Timothy Pastoor, PhD) [hereinafter Pastoor testimony] (“At best this is a duplication of effort and at worst is an opportunity to sow confusion in the public’s mind.”).
According to Robert E. Tarone, PhD, had the Working Group assessing glyphosate
conducted a proper summary of the rodent studies it would not have concluded that
rodent studies provide sufficient evidence that glyphosate was an animal carcinogen. Id.
(comments of Robert E. Tarone, PhD, on the IARC classification of glyphosate as a
probable human carcinogen).
16
See Portier et al. Letter, supra note 14.
17
See generally Hearing, supra note 15.
Despite the global controversy, Kurt Straif, who until recently was the Head of the
IARC Monographs Program, confidently asserted, “I’m very happy with the way we do
things at the moment. We are really at the head of the scientific community,” and “[t]his
is really the strongest possible process.” Kate Kelland, How the World Health Organization’s
cancer agency confuses consumers, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/us-health-who-iarc-special-report-idUSKCN0XF0RF [https://perma.cc/NBQ4-HW3A].
Any confusion allegedly created by the Program’s cancer classifications rests with
others—media and industry—not with IARC. Id. Much of the criticism, Straif says, is
coming from “people who are directly or indirectly affiliated with stakeholders that are
not happy with us . . . .” See Kupferschmidt, supra note 12, at 1505.
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public at large is, for all intents and purposes, shut out from the working
group deliberations.18 Nearly fifty years earlier, Congress grappled with
similar deficiencies in the manner in which federal advisory groups were
established and managed, ultimately leading to the passage of the 1972
Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”), which sets forth, inter alia,
strictures that govern advisory committees “established or utilized by”
federal agencies.19
The potential intersection between the IARC Monographs Program,
its working groups, and FACA may not be readily apparent, but given
the close, decades long relationship between the IARC and the NCI, it is
reasonable to ask whether the working groups are in fact advisory committees “established or utilized by” the NCI.20
This Article explores that question, perhaps for the first time,
ultimately answering it in the affirmative. Extending FACA’s reach to
the IARC working groups and the manner in which they render cancer
classifications may help to quell at least some of the ongoing controversy
surrounding the Program.21
18

See Kelland, supra note 17.
Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972).
20
Id.
21
The controversy surrounding IARC’s glyphosate cancer classification is certainly not the
first time the Monographs Program has garnered criticisms. In a 1998 letter to Dr. Gro
Harlem Brundtland, Director General of the World Health Organization (in which IARC is
situated), Michael Jacobson, Executive Director of the Center for Science in the Public Interest, along with four other scientists, unabashedly accuse IARC of rigging the review of
saccharin to exonerate it (the working group classified saccharin in Group 2B—possibly
carcinogenic to humans—rather than a higher cancer classification of Group 2A or Group 1).
Michael F. Jacobson et al., Letter to Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Director General WHO,
8 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 279, 279–80 (2002). In their letter, the authors
called upon the WHO to—(1) “demand that the IARC withdraw its report [on saccharin],”
(2) “appoint a new director for the chemical evaluation process,” and (3) “appoint a new and
balanced committee of unquestioned integrity, and then reevaluate saccharin.” Id. at 279.
Harsh criticisms of the IARC Monographs Program extended into the 2000s. During
2002 and 2003, for example, the International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health published several articles from scientists highly critical of the IARC
Monographs Program and industry’s influence on the make-up of the working groups and
their bias toward downgrading the cancer classification of previously reviewed agents.
In a 2002 article in the journal, James Huff, former head of the IARC Monographs Program, accused J. Rice, head of the IARC Monographs Program from 1996 to 2003, and Paul
Kleihues, IARC Director from 1994 to 2003, of ushering in an “era of ‘downgrading’ chemicals
in general, often using ‘mechanistic cover-ups,’ with many of those chemicals/agents being
placed unceremoniously into the nebulous category of ‘unclassifiable as to carcinogenicity’
[Group 3].” James Huff, IARC Monographs, Industry Influence, and Upgrading, Downgrading, and Under-grading Chemicals: A Personal Point of View, 8 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL
& ENVTL. HEALTH 249, 250 (2002).
19
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Part I provides an overview of the IARC Monographs Program and
its ongoing relationship with the National Cancer Institute. Part II explores
the impetus of FACA, and reviews key provisions. Part III discusses FACA
jurisprudence, focusing on Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, the
seminal FACA case, and its D.C. Circuit progeny. Part IV pulls the pieces
together in arguing that FACA applies to the working groups of the IARC
Monographs Program.

Huff notes that, “[s]o far, there have been 12 chemicals/agents downgraded by IARC,
and all relatively recently under the Rice/Kleihues regime . . . .” Id. at 253. Eleven of the
twelve were downgraded from Group 2B (possibly carcinogenic to humans), to Group 3
(not classifiable as to its carcinogenicity to humans). Id. Atrazine, a popular herbicide,
was one of the eleven downgraded to Group 3. According to Huff, this downgrading was
encouraged by Rice and others “in the belief that the alleged mechanisms are rodentspecific and would not be operative in humans.” Id. Huff, however, asserts that “[t]hese
are clearly and simply unproven speculations, not yet validated experimentally.” Id.
Huff also accuses J. Rice of under-grading many chemicals by assigning them to a
cancer classification group not commensurate with their cancer hazard. Huff cites 1, 3butadiene as “probably the prime example of the overt influence of industry on the IARC
Monographs process. This chemical remains in Group 2A (probably carcinogenic) rather
than being upgraded into Group 1 (human carcinogen) . . . .” Id. at 254–55. In sum,
compared with the Tomatis tenure at IARC, which according to Huff “clearly show[ed]
a more public health attitude,” the “Rice years . . . show[ed] an overwhelming industry
influence.” Id. at 260.
Paul Kleihues, MD, who at that time was the IARC Director, staunchly defended the
IARC Monographs Program, noting that “[c]onsultants to industry are not considered ineligible to serve on Working Groups provided that they are permitted to publish their
findings without oversight or censorship of any kind from their industrial sponsor.” Paul
Kleihues, Integrity of the Conduct of the IARC Monographs Program, 9 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 78, 78 (2003).
Kleihues also weighed in on the issue of downgrading agents—“The claim that there
has been a systematic tendency to downgrade evaluations simply does not stand up to
objective examination.” Id. at 79. In a follow-up letter to the editor of the journal, Tomatis
is decidedly unpersuaded—“In spite of the claim made by Professor Kleihues in his letter,
doubts unfortunately remain about the influence that interests other than those of scientific truth and of public health may have had on evaluations of the carcinogenicity of
certain agents . . . .” Lorenzo Tomatis, The IARC Must Maintain Its Important Role in the
Protection of Public Health, 9 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 82, 82 (2003).
In a subsequent response to Kleihues’s article, Huff reprises his condemnations—
“Strangely, Kleihues/Rice remain adamant in refusing to admit or contemplate the truth
of the criticisms leveled against the Monographs Program. Alleged conflicts of interest
and overt industry participation and influence on the IARC Monographs must be addressed
aggressively and independently.” James Huff, Industry Influences IARC Carcinogenesis
Evaluations, 9 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 82, 83–84 (2003); see also Jennifer
Sass, Continued Insensitivity to Conflicts of Interest at IARC, 9 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL
& ENVTL. HEALTH 83, 83–84 (2003) (“The practice of allowing the regulated industries to
freely participate in the discussions and decisions of the working groups compromises
both public health and the scientific integrity of the Monographs.”).
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In 1970, IARC’s Advisory Committee on Environmental Carcinogenesis recommended “that a compendium on carcinogenic chemicals be
prepared by experts”22 and that this compendium should reference and
document “[t]he biological activity and evaluation of practical importance
to public health . . . .”23 The following year, the IARC Monographs Program
was formally established under the stewardship of Lorenzo Tomatis.24
The IARC’s Governing Council, at its ninth session, subsequently ratified
the importance and continuance of the Monographs Program by unanimously passing a resolution to continue “the preparation of monographs
on the evaluation of carcinogenic risk of chemicals to man,” after “considering that the Agency [(IARC)] should play an advisory role in the field
of environmental carcinogenesis . . . .”25
The Monographs Program—as its name suggests—issues monographs, the instrument in which the IARC conveys and qualitatively
evaluates the scientific information on the carcinogenicity of agents,
which often include chemicals.26 Each agent reviewed in a monograph is
22

IARC WORKING GROUP, IARC MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF THE CARCINOGENIC
RISK OF CHEMICALS TO MAN VOLUME 1, at 8 (Dec. 1971). Prior to the Monographs Program,
IARC initially envisioned creating two lists of chemical carcinogens—one for human carcinogens and another list for animal carcinogens—but this notion was soon abandoned for
several reasons, including “the implicit danger that all chemicals not included in the
‘black list’ of carcinogens could be automatically assumed to be safe.” Lorenzo Tomatis,
The IARC Program on the Evaluation of the Carcinogenic Risk of Chemicals to Man, 271
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIENCES 396, 397 (1976). It is not at all clear, however, how the current list of carcinogens developed by the IARC Monographs Program avoids this “implicit
danger.” Id.
23
See IARC WORKING GROUP, supra note 22, at 8.
24
See Davis, supra note 1, at 29. Tomatis was the second director of IARC; his term extended from 1982 until 1993. RODOLFO SARACCI & CHRISTOPHER P. WILD, INTERNATIONAL
AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER: THE FIRST 50 YEARS (1965–2015) 143 (2015).
25
IARC, HANDBOOK OF RESOLUTIONS OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE INTERNATIONAL
AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER 14 (23d ed. 2018) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF RESOLUTIONS].
26
Monographs are issued in volumes; each volume may contain one or more monographs.
See IARC, PREAMBLE TO THE IARC MONOGRAPHS 3 (Jan. 2019), https://monographs.iarc
.fr/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Preamble-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF7K-Y29T] [hereinafter
PREAMBLE]. The Monographs Program initially focused on evaluating carcinogenic risks
of chemicals to humans, but expanded its scope in 1987–1988 by dropping the words “of
chemicals” in order to “denote the much-enlarged scope of the programme, covering physical,
chemical, and biological agents as well as mixtures of compounds (like tobacco smoke)
and circumstances” like some occupations. SARACCI & WILD, supra note 24, at 146–47.
In 2019, the Preamble to the IARC Monographs was updated, based in part on the
comments submitted by numerous organizations, including the U.S. Department of
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Health and Human Services (HHS) and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA).
See, e.g., PREAMBLE, supra. Individual scientists and academicians also offered comments.
As discussed infra Part I, Monographs address the hazard of an agent under review,
not its risk. Risk by definition involves a more comprehensive evaluation of an agent, taking into account hazard and exposure. Nonetheless, from its inception and for decades
thereafter, the title of the Monographs had incorporated the term “risk” not “hazard.” In
its comments, HHS recommended a revised title: “IARC Monographs Evaluating Hazards
related to Carcinogenic Risks in Humans.” PUBLIC COMMENTS FORM: TO PROPOSE AN
UPDATE TO THE PREAMBLE TO THE IARC MONOGRAPHS 150–51, https://monographs.iarc
.fr/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Preamble_PublicComments.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U3X
-ZSNV] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019) [hereinafter PUBLIC COMMENTS TO THE PREAMBLE].
The EFSA offered a simpler change, replacing the word “risks” with “hazards” to
yield: “IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Hazards to Humans.” Id. at
121–22. IARC adopted the EFSA version. See PREAMBLE, supra, at 1.
HHS also suggested that IARC combine the Group 2A and Group 2B cancer classifications into a new Group 2 classification. HHS offered two alternative designations
for Group 2: “Agent is suspect but further studies required,” or “Partial evidence to be
declared carcinogenic.” PUBLIC COMMENTS TO THE PREAMBLE, supra, at 151. IARC rejected
these suggested changes and instead retained both the longstanding Group 2A and Group
2B cancer classifications. See PREAMBLE, supra, at 1.
The National Cancer Institute (NCI) (which contributed comments to the HHS submission) recommended that “the preamble should describe a process for petition and
redress of questionable decisions of prior monographs for the uncommon circumstance
when new information casts doubt on a prior monograph or indicates reevaluation is
warranted.” PUBLIC COMMENTS TO THE PREAMBLE, supra, at 152. NCI expressed concern
that without such a petition process the opportunity to consider new information might
not occur until several years after it became available. Id. at 152–53. IARC rejected this
suggestion. See PREAMBLE, supra, at 1. Although the revised Preamble now states “On
occasion, IARC may select other agents if there is a need to rapidly evaluate an emerging
carcinogenic hazard or an urgent need to re-evaluate a previous classification,” IARC still
selects agents to review “about every five years.” Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
The Preamble also delineates three types of agents that the Monographs Program
may review:
(a) An agent not reviewed in a previous Monograph, if there is potential
human exposure and there is evidence for assessing its carcinogenicity.
A group of related agents (e.g., metal compounds) may be reviewed together if there is evidence for assessing carcinogenicity for one or more
members of the group.
(b) An agent reviewed in a previous Monograph, if there is new evidence
of cancer in humans or in experimental animals, or mechanistic evidence
to warrant re-evaluation of the classification. In the interests of efficiency,
the literature searches may build on previous comprehensive searches.
(c) An agent that has been established to be carcinogenic to humans
and has been reviewed in a previous Monograph, if there is new evidence of cancer in humans that indicates new tumour sites where there
might be a causal 8 association. In the interests of efficiency, the review
may focus on these new tumour sites.
PREAMBLE, supra, at 3–4. Volume 1 of the Monographs was developed by an IARC Working
Group, which was convened in Geneva from December 13–17, 1971. IARC WORKING
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classified into one of four categories based on the scientific judgement of
the working group: Group 1, the agent is carcinogenic to humans; Group
2A, the agent is probably carcinogenic to humans; Group 2B, the agent is
possibly carcinogenic to humans; and Group 3, the agent is not classifiable
as to its carcinogenicity to humans.27 These formal IARC classifications
were adopted in 1987–1988.28 Prior to then, monographs expressed carcinogenicity “in a narrative style with variable language as suited to each
Working Group.”29
The Monographs Program assesses the hazard of agents, not their
risks.30 Hazard identification entails determining whether an agent is
capable of causing cancer.31 Whereas evaluating risk entails a more elaborate and informative process, which includes hazard identification as well
as exposure and dose-response assessment to characterize the circumstances and probabilities by which the agent causes cancer.32
GROUP, supra note 22, at 6. The monograph was finalized and made publicly available
in 1972. SARACCI & WILD, supra note 24, at 145. The practice of convening working groups
to develop monographs has continued to the present, although for many years meetings
have been held in Lyon, France, where IARC is headquartered. See Pearce et al., supra
note 4, at 509–10.
27
PREAMBLE, supra note 26, at 35–36. The previous Group 4, “the agent is probably not
carcinogenic to humans,” was abandoned in the 2019 Preamble. IARC provided no explanation for this change. See generally id. (void of Group 4). But see SARACCI & WILD, supra
note 24, at 145 (mentioning group 4).
28
SARACCI & WILD, supra note 24, at 146.
29
Id. at 145.
30
PREAMBLE, supra note 26, at 1 (explaining that the previous title of the Preamble was
changed from “the Identification of Carcinogenic Risks” to “the Identification of Carcinogenic Hazards,” to be consistent “with the objective of the programme”). The terms “risk”
and “hazard” are not interchangeable and the Preamble’s new title should help avoid confusion surrounding these terms. See id. As noted in the Preamble, “[a] cancer hazard is an
agent that is capable of causing cancer, whereas a cancer risk is an estimate of the probability that cancer will occur given some level of exposure to a cancer hazard.” Id. at 2.
Occasionally the monographs will venture into the risk realm. For example, the
monograph on red meat and processed meat consumption “concluded that each 50 gram
portion of processed meat eaten daily increases the risk of colorectal cancer by 18%.”
Press Release, IARC, IARC Monographs evaluate consumption of red meat & processed
meat (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.iarc.fr/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/pr240_E.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LK8T-P6QE].
31
PREAMBLE, supra note 26, at 2.
32
See Conducting a Human Health Risk Assessment, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/risk/con
ducting-human-health-risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/S826-YJDF] (last visited Dec. 3,
2019) (explaining the steps required to conduct a full risk evaluation); see also NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION, UNDERSTANDING HAZARDS AND
RISKS 30 n.1 (1989) (explaining that one difference between hazard and risk is that risk
“takes probability explicitly into account,” while hazard does not). IARC Monographs
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Consequently, under the IARC’s cancer classification scheme, agents
such as asbestos, tobacco smoking, and processed meat33 are assigned the
same cancer classification—Group 1, known human carcinogen—despite
the fact that they pose vastly different risks.34
The work horses of the IARC Monographs Program are the working
groups, assembled to consider the science on a particular agent under
review and to render a cancer classification determination.35 The objectives of each working group meeting are twofold—peer review and consensus, which does not necessarily mean unanimity.36
Generally, the IARC convenes three working groups each year to
review agents.37 A working group reviews one or more agents.38 The
IARC’s working groups typically have members who have published on
the agent under evaluation.39 Some view this arrangement as injecting
inherent bias into the review process.40 As with other criticisms lodged at
the IARC, Kurt Straif—former head of the IARC Monographs Program—
brushed these concerns aside, claiming that the “IARC has a strong
Questions and Answers, IARC, https://www.iarc.fr/en/media-centre/iarcnews/pdf/Mono
graphs-Q&A.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6NP-FU27] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019). “The Monographs
Programme may identify cancer hazards even when risks are very low with known patterns of use or exposure.” As noted by Pastoor in his House testimony: “There are a wide
variety of substances that may be labeled as carcinogenic . . . but in real life we could
never consume enough or be exposed to enough to suffer adverse consequences.” Pastoor
Testimony, supra note 15, at 3; see also Alan R. Boobis et al., Classification Schemes for
Carcinogenicity Based on Hazard-Identification Have Become Outmoded and Serve Neither
Science nor Society, 82 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 158, 165 (2016) (“Chemicals
with seven orders of magnitude difference in the dose required to cause cancer can be
placed in the same category. This is how eating processed meat can fall into the same
category as sulfur mustard gas.”).
33
WHO was quick to issue a clarification, stating, “[P]rocessed meat has been classified
in the same category as causes of cancer such as tobacco smoking and asbestos (IARC
Group 1, carcinogenic to humans), but this does NOT mean that they are all equally
dangerous. The IARC classifications describe the strength of the scientific evidence about
an agent being a cause of cancer, rather than assessing the level of risk.” Q&A on the
carcinogenicity of the consumption of red meat and processed meat, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/features/qa/cancer-red-meat/en/ [https://perma.cc/QS8Z-DSN3] (last
visited Dec. 3, 2019); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
34
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 33.
35
See generally GRANT APPLICATION, supra note 8.
36
PREAMBLE, supra note 26, at 6–7, 11.
37
Jack Siemiatycki et al., Occupation, in CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY AND PREVENTION 324
(David Schottenfeld & Joseph F. Fraumeni, Jr. eds., 3d ed. 2006).
38
See PREAMBLE, supra note 26, at 4.
39
See id.
40
Kelland, supra note 17.
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belief . . . that those who know the most about certain exposures are
those who have worked on such exposures.”41
Meetings are held at the IARC in Lyon, France, and last for several days.42 Four Subgroups, each responsible for a specific section of the
monograph (i.e., “exposure data, cancer in humans, cancer in experimental
animals, . . . and other relevant data”), peer review and revise draft documents that were prepared before the meeting by working group members
with assistance from the IARC staff.43 Each monograph concludes by
classifying the agent as to its carcinogenicity.44
From its inception, and throughout its formative years and beyond,
the IARC Monographs Program has turned to the NCI for assistance.45
Indeed, the NCI’s expertise and funding have sustained the IARC Monographs Program.46 The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
calculated the total National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) funding to the
IARC from 1985 at over $48 million, of which over $22 million supported
the IARC Monographs Program.47
The NCI’s support, in fact, represents the lion’s share of the IARC
Monographs Program’s budget.48 This funding supports working groups
41

Id. In the application for NCI funding, Kurt Straif states unequivocally that “[t]he
Monographs are unique in that they are developed by experts who conducted the original
research.” GRANT APPLICATION, supra note 8, at 76.
42
IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans, IARC (June 11,
2012), https://www.iarc.fr/media-centre-iarc-news-49/ [https://perma.cc/E5HA-A6EE]. The
working group meetings can test the endurance of members—“We really worked around
the clock, up late into the night and all weekend . . . .” Kelland, supra note 17.
43
PREAMBLE, supra note 26, at 6.
44
Id. at 22–23.
45
The NCI assisted the IARC Monographs Program in assembling data on use and
occurrence for the chemicals reviewed in Volume 1. Numerous Governing Council (“GC”)
Resolutions evidence the NCI’s financial support to IARC and its Monographs Program
including the following during the Program’s formative years: In October 1972, the GC
authorized the acceptance from NIH of up to $600,000 per annum for the programme.
HANDBOOK OF RESOLUTIONS, supra note 25, at 186. In a May 1974 resolution the GC
accepted NCI contribution “in amounts not to exceed U.S. $210,000 per annum.” Id. GC
authorized acceptance of NCI funds in amounts not to exceed $290,000 in April 1977. Id.
at 189. In May 1978, the GC expressed “profound gratitude to the National Cancer Institute for . . . generous contributions to the work of the Agency.” Id. at 190.
46
Pearce et al., supra note 4, at 509. As noted by Tomatis himself, “[t]he NCI supports
this program financially and has helped the Agency considerably by providing surveys
of available pertinent literature.” Tomatis, supra note 22, at 397.
47
Smith & Biggs Letter, supra note 15, at 1.
48
See Pearce et al., supra note 4, at 509 (“The IARC Monograph Programme is mainly
funded by the U.S. National Cancer Institute . . . .”).
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to produce two of the three monograph volumes each year.49 The NCI
relies on a cooperative agreement as the funding mechanism, which, by
its very nature, entails significant NCI programmatic involvement with
the IARC Monographs Program “above and beyond the normal stewardship role in awards.”50 Fueled by NCI funding, the IARC Monographs
Program churns out more cancer classification determinations51 than any
49

Department of Health and Human Services: Part 1. Overview Information, NAT’L INSTS.
HEALTH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/rfa-files/RFA-CA-14-503.html [https://perma
.cc/R5C5-6BK3] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Funding Announcement]. The fiveyear commitment from the NCI is approximately $4.3 million. Email from Paulette Gray,
Dir., Div. of Extramural Activities, Nat’l Cancer Inst., to Ron Johnson, Program Dir.,
DNA & Chromosome Aberrations Branch, Div. of Cancer Biology, Nat’l Cancer Inst.
(May 20, 2014) (on file with author). Kurt Straif, former Head of the IARC Monographs
Program initially requested nearly $5 million from the NCI. Kurt Straif letter to Ron
Johnson, Program Dir., DNA & Chromosome Aberrations Branch, Div. of Cancer Biology,
Nat’l Cancer Inst. (May 20, 2014) (on file with author). In FY 2017, the National Institute
of Environmental Health Sciences, provided nearly $100,000 in supplemental funds to
the IARC Monographs Program. See Project Information: Evaluation of Carcinogenic
Risks to Humans, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, https://projectreporter.nih.gov/project_info
_details.cfm?aid=9334069&icde=40932103 [https://perma.cc/QNF8-YGSQ] (last visited
Dec. 3, 2019).
50
Funding Announcement, supra note 49. NCI’s involvement with the Monographs Program
extends beyond financial support to encompass “substantial programmatic involvement
required to 1) coordinate interactions between the NCI and the IARC Monographs program; 2) suggest agents to the IARC for evaluation; 3) identify resource individuals to
attend or participate in Advisory or Working Groups of the IARC Monographs program;
and 4) monitor performance and make recommendations for process improvements.”
Memorandum from Ron Johnson, Program Dir., DNA & Chromosome Aberrations Branch,
Div. of Cancer Biology, Nat’l Cancer Inst., to Henry Khachaturian, Extramural Program
Policy Officer, Office of Extramural Programs, NIH, Justification Memorandum for Use of
Cooperative Agreement for RFA-CA-14-503, Limited Competition: International Agency for
Research on Cancer (IARC) Monograph Program (U01) (Aug. 26, 2014) (on file with author).
The NCI’s responsibilities include making recommendations to the IARC Monographs Program, and liaising between the Program “and other NCI and NIH programs
to stimulate broader interactions, recommend agents for evaluation, identify resource
individuals, disseminate results and leverage existing NIH resources and infrastructures.”
Funding Announcement, supra note 49.
51
Since its inception in the early 1970s, IARC has evaluated over 1,000 agents. See IARC
Monographs, IARC, https://monographs.iarc.fr/home/iarc-monographs-general-informa
tion/ [https://perma.cc/WVP6-FZB5] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019). Of these, 120 agents are
in Group 1, carcinogenic to humans; 83 in Group 2A, probably carcinogenic to humans; 314
in Group 2B, possibly carcinogenic to humans; and 500 are in Group 3, not classifiable as
to its carcinogenicity to humans. See Agents Classified by the IARC Monographs, Volumes
1–125, IARC, https://monographs.iarc.fr/agents-classified-by-the-iarc/ [https://perma.cc
/E582-DEJG] (last updated Nov. 29, 2019). As noted previously, supra note 26, the Preamble has abandoned Group 4. Subsequently, IARC moved the one agent in Group
4—caprolactam—into Group 3. See Agents Classified by the IARC Monographs, Volumes
1–124, supra (moving caprolactam from Group 4 to Group 3 after Preamble update).
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other agency, including for example, the U.S. National Toxicology Program’s Report on Carcinogens52 and the State of California’s Proposition
65 Program.53
The IARC asserts that “[t]he Monographs conduct open and transparent evaluations . . . .”54 Yet only a select few are permitted to attend
IARC working group meetings, and no draft documents are ever released
for public scrutiny and input.55 Working group members and observers56
attending the Monograph meetings must all sign a confidentiality agreement that requires them to, inter alia, “exercise the utmost discretion in
all matters relating to the [Monographs] Advisory Process and not to
communicate the deliberations and decisions of the Advisory Process to
52

“The Report on Carcinogens is a congressionally mandated, science-based, public health
document that NTP prepares for the HHS Secretary. This cumulative report currently
includes 248 listings of agents, substances, mixtures, and exposure circumstances that
are known or reasonably anticipated to cause cancer in humans.” See 14th Report on
Carcinogens, NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://
ntp.niehs.nih.gov/pubhealth/roc/index-1.html [https://perma.cc/G7PY-BZBC] (last updated
Sept. 25, 2019).
53
“Proposition 65 requires the state [of California] to maintain and update a list of
chemicals known to the state to cause cancer or other reproductive toxicity.” See Proposition
65, CAL. OFF. ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, https://oehha.ca.gov/proposition-65
[https://perma.cc/2XGQ-6XRV] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019); see also The Proposition 65 List,
CAL. OFF. ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, https://oehha.ca.gov/proposition-65/propo
sition-65-list [https://perma.cc/BA93-KZTL] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019). The listing of chemicals, as of September 13, 2019, includes 623 carcinogens. See STATE OF CAL. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, CHEMICALS KNOWN TO THE STATE TO CAUSE CANCER OR REPRODUCTIVE TOXICITY,
https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/proposition-65//p65list091319.pdf [https://perma
.cc/68BN-FEJS]. For a discussion of Proposition 65 and its infirmities, see David B.
Fischer, Proposition 65 Warnings at 30—Time for a Different Approach, 11 J. BUS. & TECH.
L. 131 (2016).
54
GRANT APPLICATION, supra note 8, at 83.
55
This pronounced lack of transparency was recently underscored by the House Science
Committee—“Throughout the review process for the monograph, IARC, the only agency
to characterize glyphosate as ‘probably’ a carcinogen, has kept drafts of its glyphosate
report confidential. The other agencies that conducted review of glyphosate . . . were open
about their processes, publishing information regarding public comments and draft
reviews.” Smith & Biggs Letter, supra note 15, at 2. The Congressmen requested that
Wild provide the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, “the names and
contact information of IARC-affiliated individuals who would serve as potential witnesses
for this hearing.” Id. at 3. Wild responded to the letter but did not furnish the information
requested. See Letter from Christopher J. Wild, Dir., IARC, to Congressmen Lamar Smith
& Andy Biggs (Nov. 20, 2017), https://governance.iarc.fr/ENG/Docs/CPWild-LSmith&
ABiggs.pdf [https://perma.cc/HF9N-T2YG].
56
See, e.g., IARC Monographs—Volume 126—Request for Observer Status, IARC (Mar. 27,
2019), https://monographs.iarc.fr/iarc-monographs-meetings/iarc-monographs-volume-126
-request-for-observer-status/ [https://perma.cc/68PB-KNMZ].
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third parties except as agreed by IARC/WHO.”57 In short, the procedures
which govern working group meetings and the preparation of monographs stand in stark contrast to FACA requirements discussed infra
Part II.
II.

THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT—A BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF
KEY PROVISIONS

The Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”) was passed in 1972
“to cure specific ills, above all the wasteful expenditure of public funds for
worthless committee meetings and biased proposals . . . .”58 and “reflects
the good-government values that motivated its passage.”59 Until its passage, no federal legislation addressed the establishment and conduct of
advisory committees, despite the plethora of committees relied upon by
the federal government.60 Literally thousands of advisory committees
dotted the federal governmental landscape prior to FACA’s passage, of
which Congress was acutely aware.61 “[T]he system of advisory committees that has grown up over the years might well be described as a fifth
57

Confidentiality Undertaking, IARC, https://monographs.iarc.fr/wp-content/uploads
/2018/08/124-ConfidentialityUndertaking.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SZU-6HF8] (last visited
Dec. 3, 2019).
58
Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 441 (1989).
59
Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good
Government, 14 YALE J. REG. 451, 465 (1997). The General Services Administration (“GSA”)
administers FACA. Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 § 1, 5 U.S.C.A. App. 2 § 3(1)
(West 1997). S. 3529, which amended H.R. 4383 to become the Federal Advisory Committee Act, was passed by both Houses and signed into law on October 6, 1972, and was
itself an amalgam of “the best features” of three Senate bills—S. 1637, S. 1964 and S.
2064. S. REP. NO. 92-1098, at 4 (1972). For comprehensive information on FACA, guidance
documents, and other pertinent information, see Statutes and Related Legislation, U.S.
GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/federal-advisory-com
mittee-management/statutes-and-related-legislation [https://perma.cc/WQH5-4ZL5] (last
updated Feb. 26, 2019).
60
Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 445–46.
61
An exact count of federal advisory committees was unknown, but estimates were as
high as 3,200. S. REP. NO. 92-1098, at 4. One agency listed 383 advisory committees, then
revised the figure to 420, only to raise the count again to 511. H.R. REP. NO. 92-1017, at
3492 (1972). The vast number of federal advisory committees spawned concerns about
their utility and the growing “belief that these committees do not adequately and fairly
represent the public interest . . . .” S. REP. NO. 92-1098, at 5. Federal advisory committees
often operated without adequate opportunity for public involvement. Id. at 6. Not all
federal advisory committees of course were viewed with a jaundiced eye; many federal
advisory committees provided useful and beneficial expert advice. Id. at 5. Congress’s
first attempt at inquiring into the operations of advisory committees was the 1070 Special
Studies Subcommittee investigation. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-1017, at 3495.
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arm of the Government, existing alongside the executive, legislative, judicial and regulatory arms.”62
The growth and reliance on advisory committees was viewed by the
public as indicia of governmental “inefficiency and indecisiveness.”63 In
passing FACA, Congress wanted to reign in the power of special interests
who “had too much influence over federal agency decision makers.”64
Through FACA, Congress explicitly declared that advisory committees
should be established only when needed, terminated when no longer useful,
and subject to governance standards and procedures.65
FACA section 3(2), defines an “advisory committee” as “any committee, board, . . . or other similar group, or any subcommittee or other
subgroup thereof . . . which is (A) established by statute or reorganization
plan, or (B) established or utilized by the President, or (C) established or
62

S. REP. NO. 92-1098, at 13.
Id. at 5.
64
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-611T, FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT:
ISSUES RELATED TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND BALANCE OF ADVISORY COMMITTEES (2008).
Hundreds of advisory committees dot the federal landscape. These advisory committees
may take various forms, from boards to committees to councils, but if they dispense advice
to a federal agency, they likely fall within the reach of FACA. The Environmental Protection Agency’s Science Advisory Board, for example, “provide[s] independent advice and
peer review to EPA’s Administrator on the scientific and technical aspects of environmental issues.” See EPA, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY CHARTER
(2017), https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/Web/2017SABcharter/$File/SABCharter
Sept2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KE9-3JSG].
On June 14, 2019, President Trump issued an Executive Order (EO) on Evaluating
and Improving the Utility of Federal Advisory Committees. The EO, inter alia, mandates
that each executive department and agency—with the exception of independent regulatory agencies—“evaluate the need for each of its current advisory committees.” Exec.
Order No. 13,875, 84 Fed. Reg. 28,711, 28,711 (June 14, 2019).
Under section 1 of the EO, each agency is required to “terminate at least one-third
of its current committees established under section 9(a)(2) of FACA” unless a waiver is
granted by the Office of Management and Budget. 84 Fed. Reg. at 28,711. A waiver may
be granted “if the Director [of OMB] concludes it is necessary for the delivery of essential
services, for effective program delivery, or because it is otherwise warranted by the public
interest.” Id.
Section 2 of the EO places limits on the creation of new advisory committees and
imposes an overall cap of 350 on Government-wide advisory committees. Id. As with
Section 1, waivers may be granted. Id. Section 3 delineates reporting requirements (e.g.,
“a recommendation for each of the agency’s current advisory committees established by
the President under section 9(a)(1) of FACA regarding whether the committee should be
continued.”) Id. at 28,712.
Sections 1–3 of the EO do not apply to an “advisory committee whose primary
purpose is to provide scientific expertise to support agencies making decisions related to
the safety or efficacy of products to be marketed to American consumers.” Id.
65
Federal Advisory Committee Act § 2(b).
63
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utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of obtaining advice or
recommendations for the President or one or more agencies or officers of
the Federal Government . . . .”66
Under FACA, no advisory committee can be established unless
authorized by statute or by the President, or determined to be in the public
interest by the head of an agency, after “timely notice published in the
Federal Register.”67 Section 9 requires the filing of a charter before an

66

Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 § 1, 5 U.S.C.A. App. 2 § 3(2) (West 1997).
S.3529 contained the words “established or organized,” not “utilized.” S. REP. NO. 92-1098,
at 6 (1972). The terms established and organized were to be interpreted “in their most
liberal sense,” capturing within their reach “committees of the national academies where
they are utilized and officially recognized as advisory to . . . an agency. . . .” Id. at 8. The
conference substitute inserted the term “utilized” in place of “organized” without providing any explanation. H.R. REP. NO. 92-1403, at 3509 (1972) (Conf. Rep.).
Section 3(2) of FACA excludes from the advisory committee definition “(i) any committee
that is composed wholly of full-time or permanent part-time, officers or employees of the
Federal Government, and (ii) any committee that is created by the National Academy of
Sciences [NAS] or the National Academy of Public Administration [NAP].” Federal Advisory
Committee Act § 3(2). FACA was amended in the wake of and in response to the decision
from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Animal Legal Defense Fund v.
Shalala, discussed infra Part III, which held that FACA applied to advisory committees
under the auspices of the NAS. 104 F.3d 424, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Notwithstanding the
court’s rationale undergirding its holding, the Executive branch and both Houses of
Congress all agreed that the NAS and NAP should not be subject to FACA’s strictures. 143
CONG. REC. H10,578-02, 10,579 (1997). Even the plaintiffs in Animal Legal Def. Fund
testified before Congress “that the full brunt of the Federal Advisory Committee Act should
not apply to the academies.” Id. at 10,579. Although H.R. 2977 amended FACA to exempt
NAS committees from the definition of advisory committees, Congress also added a new
section 15, which delineated requirements specifically applicable to the NAS and NAPA.
Federal Advisory Committee Act § 15. Unlike Section 10’s predilection to have all meetings, with few exceptions, open to the public, Section 15 takes a narrower view of public
participation; only “meetings of the committee to gather data from individuals who are not
officials, agents, or employees of the Academy are open to the public” (subject to FOIA disclosure exceptions). Id. § 15(b)(3). Similarly, the public’s access to written documents is
severely constrained—only final reports and “a brief summary of any committee meeting
that is not a data gathering meeting” are available to the public. Id. § 15(b)(4). Through
these amendments, Congress sought to “benefit the public and Federal agencies and . . .
contribute to the quality and credibility of Academy reports.” 143 CONG. REC. H10,578-02,
at 10,580.
The White House Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) had wanted Congress
to perform more radical surgery and entirely exclude from FACA “any committee created
by an entity other than an agency or officer of the Federal Government and not subject
to actual management and control by such agencies or officers.” Id. at 10,579. Congress
ultimately opted not to comport with the OMB’s wishes. Id.
67
Federal Advisory Committee Act § 9(a). This provision was aimed at stopping if not
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advisory committee can “meet or take any action.”68 The contents of the
charter include, among other pertinent information, the committee’s objectives and scope; the length of time for the committee to complete its work
and its termination date; and the committee’s specific duties.69 Advisory
committees, as the name suggests, are to be used only for advisory functions, unless directed otherwise by statute or Presidential directive.70
FACA section 10 gives sweeping expression to Congress’s desire
to provide public participation and access to advisory committee proceedings.71 Subject to limited exceptions, advisory committee meetings must
be “timely” noticed in the Federal Register and open to the public; the public must be “permitted to attend, appear before, or file statements with
any advisory committee”; and all documents—whether draft or final—
must be made available to the public for inspection and copying.72 Advisory committee meetings are held upon approval of a designated officer
or employee of the federal government, who must also approve the
agenda and attend the meeting.73 Advisory committee membership must
be “fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the
functions to be performed by the advisory committee.”74

reversing “the trend toward bureaucratic proliferation of advisory committees.” S. REP.
NO. 92-1098, at 13.
68
Federal Advisory Committee Act § 9.
69
Id.
70
Id. § 9(b).
71
See Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 459 (1989) (“FACA’s principal
purpose was to enhance the public accountability of advisory committees . . . and to
reduce wasteful expenditures on them.”).
72
Federal Advisory Committee Act § 10.
73
Id.
74
41 C.F.R. § 102-3.30 (2018). GSA’s final rule makes this obligation clear. FACA’s language, however, assigns this obligation to the “President, agency heads, or other Federal
officials” in establishing advisory committees, but only “[t]o the extent [it is] applicable.”
Federal Advisory Committee Act § 5. Neither the House nor Senate Report language discusses this phrase. H.R. REP. NO. 92-1017 (1972); S. REP. NO. 92-1098 (1972). Nonetheless,
the House Report underscored the importance of a balanced committee membership as
well as “assur[ing] that the advice and recommendations of the advisory committee will
not be inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or by any special interest,
but will instead be the result of the advisory committee’s independent judgment.” H.R.
REP. NO. 92-1017, at 3496; see Federal Advisory Committee Act § 5(b)(3). During hearings
on FACA, testimony before the House Legal and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee “pointed
out the danger of allowing special interest groups to exercise undue influence upon the
Government through the dominance of advisory committees which deal with matters in
which they have vested interests.” H.R. REP. NO. 92-1017, at 3496; see also U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 64 (“When the Congress enacted FACA in 1972, one
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III.

PUBLIC CITIZEN AND ITS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
D.C. CIRCUIT PROGENY

In 1989, nearly twenty years after Congress passed FACA, the
U.S. Supreme Court confronted the contours and boundaries of FACA in
the seminal case Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice.75 Public
Citizen and Washington Legal Foundation brought suit against the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) seeking a declaration that FACA covered the
DOJ’s utilization of the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Standing
Committee on the Federal Judiciary.76 The plaintiffs also sought an order
requiring the DOJ to comply with FACA’s requirements.77 The DOJ, on
behalf of the President, routinely seeks advice from the ABA Standing
Committee on potential nominees for judgeships on the federal bench.78
As noted above, FACA applies to an advisory committee “established
or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of obtaining advice or
recommendations for the President or one or more agencies . . . .”79
Because “Appellants agree[d] that the ABA Committee was not ‘established’
by the President or the Justice Department,” the Court focused its spotlight
on the term “utilized,” “as Congress intended that term to be understood.”80
Having recognized that “utilize” is “a woolly verb, its contours left
undefined by the statute itself,”81 the Court went in “search for other
evidence of congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope.”82 The
Court’s quest swept through decades of both Executive branch and Congressional efforts to regulate the federal government’s use of advisory
committees.83 Executive Order No. 11,007, signed by President Kennedy
in 196284—ten years before the passage of FACA—featured prominently
of the principal concerns it was responding to was that certain special interests had too
much influence over federal agency decision makers.”).
75
Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 441.
76
Id. at 440.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 443.
79
Federal Advisory Committee Act § 3(2)(C).
80
Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 452. The Court also noted, “[e]qually plainly, the ABA Committee is a committee that furnishes ‘advice or recommendations’ to the President via the
Justice Department.” Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 454. The Court also was propelled in its quest by “the importance we have
consistently attached to interpreting statutes to avoid deciding difficult constitutional
questions where the text fairly admits of a less problematic construction.” Id. at 455.
83
Id. at 455–65.
84
Exec. Order No. 11,007, 27 Fed. Reg. 1875 (1962). Executive Order No. 11,007 was
signed by President Kennedy on February 26, 1962. Id.
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in the Court’s analysis, and was thought by the Court not only to be “the
probable source of the term ‘utilize’ as later employed in FACA,”85 but of
wholesale provisions of FACA as well.86
In deciphering the word “utilized” the Court also canvassed FACA’s
legislative history. The Court noted, in particular, that the definition of
“advisory committee” in FACA originated from the House definition of
advisory committee but “with modification.”87 This modification referred
to the addition of “or utilized” to “established” in the final legislation.88
As remarked by the Court, “it appears that the House bill’s initial restricted focus on advisory committees established by the Federal Government, in an expanded sense of the word ‘established,’ was retained rather
than enlarged by the Conference Committee.”89 The Court went on to
clarify that, “[t]he phrase ‘or utilized’ therefore appears to have been added
simply to clarify that FACA applies to advisory committees established
by the Federal Government in a generous sense of that term, encompassing groups formed indirectly by quasi-public organizations . . . ‘for’ public
agencies as well as ‘by’ such agencies themselves.”90 The House Report
too noted that “[t]he definition contained in H.R. 4383 includes advisory
committees established by Congress or formed by the President as well
as those formed by agencies of the Government.”91
The Court readily acknowledged that FACA’s “reach is exten92
sive,” but ultimately determined that the ABA Committee was not
within “FACA’s net,” because the Committee was “an entity in receipt of
no federal funds and not amenable to the strict management by agency
officials . . . ”; and was not “formed . . . by some semiprivate entity the
Federal Government helped bring into being.”93 These determinants,
although not laid down by the Court as explicit tests or criteria, nonetheless provide useful judicial field marks to assess FACA’s reach.94

85

Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 456.
See id. at 455, 457 (noting that “like FACA, Executive Order No. 11007 stipulated that
no advisory committee be formed or utilized unless authorized by law or determined as
a matter of formal record by an agency head to be in the public interest . . . .”).
87
Id. at 457.
88
Id. at 477.
89
Id. at 462.
90
Id.
91
H.R. REP. NO. 92-1017, at 3494.
92
Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 453.
93
Id. at 457–59, 463.
94
Elsewhere in its opinion, the Court uses alternative language to describe groups that
would fall within FACA’s purview: groups that are “the offspring of some organization
86
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The first application of the Supreme Court’s teachings came in
Food Chemical News v. Young, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, in which the court was asked to decide whether FACA applies to
a panel of experts selected and managed by the Federation of American
Societies for Experimental Biology (“FASEB”) pursuant to FASEB’s contract with the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).95 The court held
that FACA did not apply to the panel of experts convened by FASEB.96
In reaching its determination that the expert panel was established97 by
FASEB, not by the FDA, a federal agency, the court articulated indicia
of a government-formed advisory group: “FASEB proposed the panel, and
alone selected its members. FASEB also set the panel’s agenda, scheduled its meetings, and would have reviewed the panel’s work.”98
The court also held that FASEB, not the FDA, “directly ‘utilized’
the panel.”99 The court reasoned that FASEB “is a private organization
and government contractor; it does not have ‘quasi-public status,’ ” and
the panel, managed by FASEB, was “ ‘not amenable to [any] management
by FDA officials,’ or ‘by [any] semiprivate entity the Federal Government
helped bring into being.’ ”100
In Washington Legal Foundation v. U.S. Sentencing Commission,
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals grappled once again with the reach of
FACA, this time determining whether an advisory group created by the
created or permeated by the Federal Government,” or “groups organized by, or closely
tied to, the Federal Government, and thus enjoying quasi-public status.” Id. at 461, 463.
95
Food Chemical News v. Young, 900 F.2d 328, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
96
Id. at 333.
97
Id. (“In the [Supreme] Court’s delineation, as we understand it, ‘established’ indicates
‘a Government-formed advisory committee,’ . . . .”).
98
Id.; see also Byrd v. EPA, 174 F.3d 239, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“The record . . . belies any
claim that EPA in fact ‘established’ the panel as required by FACA.”) The court, however,
might have reached a different result if EPA had exercised its veto authority in the panel
selection process. For Judge Williams, in his dissent in Byrd, “[t]he veto power is key,”
whether or not it was exercised. Id. at 249.
See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 736 F. Supp. 2d 24, 32 (D.D.C.
2010) (“[T]he government ‘establishes’ an advisory committee when the government
directly forms it.”); Wash. Toxics Coalition v. EPA, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1272 (W.D.
Wash. 2004) (“A relationship between a federal entity and a developing committee does
not, in itself, indicate that the government established that committee.”).
99
Food Chemical News, 900 F.2d at 333.
100
Id. (quoting Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 463 (1989)). Drawing
from FACA’s legislative history, the Court’s opinion also included the significant
observation that FASEB is not an advisory committee subject to FACA because FACA
“ ‘does not apply to persons or organizations which have contractual relationships with
Federal agencies.’ ” Id. at 331 (quoting H.R. REP. 92-1403, at 3509 (1972) (Conf. Rep.)).
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U.S. Sentencing Commission was utilized by the DOJ.101 “The dispute
center[ed] around the quantum of control an agency must have over an
advisory committee before it can be said to ‘utilize’ that committee.”102
Although the court acknowledged that DOJ would “exercise significant
influence” on the commission’s deliberations and its recommendations,
it ultimately found that “influence is not control.”103 The DOJ’s relationship with the advisory group was not “something along the lines of actual
management or control.”104 In sum, the advisory group was not utilized
by the DOJ as required by FACA.
In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Shalala,105 a committee assembled under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”)—the
august body chartered by Congress during the American Civil War106—to
revise the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals.107 The committee was funded through an NIH grant to NAS.108 Applying the “management and control” test first articulated in Public Citizen and applied
in both Washington Legal Foundation and Food Chemical News, the court
readily concluded “that no government agency could be thought to exercise
that degree of influence over the Guide Committee.”109 The appellants
emphasized, however, that in Public Citizen, “advisory committees formed
by the NAS were precisely the sort of advisory committees that would be
covered by [FACA].”110 The court agreed, reiterating part of the holding
in Public Citizen, that “Congress had in mind an extension of the Act’s
coverage to include the offspring of ‘quasi-public’ organizations ‘permeated by the Federal Government,’ ” which included NAS committees.111
101

Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 17 F.3d 1446, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1450.
103
Id. at 1451.
104
Id. at 1450.
105
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Shalala, 104 F.3d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The NAS intervened
as a co-defendant, joining HHS, the Public Health Service, and NIH. Id. at 426.
106
Who We Are, NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENGINEERING & MED., http://www.nationalacademies
.org/about/whoweare/index.html [https://perma.cc/L4SV-F49T] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
107
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 104 F.3d at 426.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 427; see also Byrd v. EPA, 174 F.3d 239, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (rejecting appellant’s
assertion that the EPA utilized the benzene panel, even assuming arguendo that EPA exercised “much more control over” the benzene panel “than the agencies in Food Chemical News
and Washington Legal Foundation exercised over the committees at issue in those cases”).
110
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 104 F.3d at 427.
111
Id. at 429 (quoting Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 463 (1989)).
The GSA, which administers FACA, promulgated a final rule on federal advisory committee management on July 19, 2001. See 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.30 (2018). The “final rule
provides administrative and interpretive guidelines and management controls for Federal
102
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Drawing from Public Citizen, the court in Animal Legal Defense
Fund articulated two prongs of the “utilize test”—the first prong “is a
stringent standard” and focuses on whether the federal agency manages
or controls the advisory committee.112 The second or alternative prong
asks “whether an organization that establishes an advisory committee
can be described as quasi-public.”113 In Animal Legal Defense Fund, the
NAS committee failed the first prong but passed the second prong.114
IV.

FACA AND THE IARC MONOGRAPHS PROGRAM—“THE TWAIN”
DO MEET

Since its very inception, IARC and its Monographs Program have
been the beneficiaries of the U.S. government’s largesse. Indeed, the NCI
has been, and continues to be, the very life blood of the Monographs Program.115 This ongoing interdependency, examined through the lens of
Public Citizen and its progeny, prompts the question whether FACA applies
to the working groups of the Monographs Program. If this question is
affirmatively answered, then the Monographs Program working groups
must be either “established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the
interest of obtaining advice or recommendations for . . . one or more
agencies or officers of the Federal Government . . . .”116
agencies to implement the provisions of the Act . . . .” Federal Advisory Committee Management, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,728 (July 19, 2001). According to GSA, “The proper statement
of the ‘utilized’ test is whether an agency either has management of the committee or, in
some fashion other than management, exercises control over the committee.” Id. GSA
cites only Washington Legal Foundation as “[t]he controlling legal authority,” and inexplicably fails to cite Animal Legal Defense Fund, in which the court clarified its decision
in Washington Legal Foundation. Id. at 37,729. The court in Animal Legal Defense Fund
stated that in Washington Legal Foundation, “[w]e did not even refer to the alternative
prong of the utilize test that comes from Public Citizen, i.e., whether an organization that
establishes an advisory committee can be described as quasi-public.” 104 F.3d at 430. The
court continued, “[w]e quoted only the first prong drawn from Food Chemical News v.
Young, ‘so closely tied to an agency as to be amendable to strict management by agency
officials.’ ” Id. (quoting Food Chemical News v. Young, 900 F.2d 328, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
112
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 104 F.3d at 430.
113
Id. See Judicial Watch v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 736 F. Supp. 2d 24, 32 (D.D.C. 2010)
(drawing on the three aforementioned D.C. Circuit cases to articulate “three ways in
which the government can ‘establish’ or ‘utilize’ an advisory committee so as to subject
it to FACA obligations”). Although the court in Judicial Watch shies away from using the
term “prong” it nonetheless accurately describes the two prongs described in Animal
Legal Defense Fund in which an advisory committee is “utilized” and therefore subject
to FACA requirements. Id. at 34.
114
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 104 F.3d at 429–30.
115
Pearce et al., supra note 4, at 509.
116
Federal Advisory Committee Act § 3(2)(C). Both sections 3(2)(A) and (B) are

2020]
A.

THE IARC MONOGRAPHS PROGRAM

553

“in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations”

Under FACA section 3(2), an “advisory committee” must furnish
“advice or recommendations for . . . one or more agencies . . . .”117 There
is ample evidence to demonstrate that the monographs produced by the
IARC working groups satisfy this stricture. From their very inception,
the monographs were to “be distributed to international and governmental
agencies, . . . [made] available to industries and scientists . . . and . . . form
the basis of advice from IARC on carcinogenesis from these substances.”118
Nearly forty years later, monographs continue to be “widely used and referenced by governments, organizations, and the public around the world.”119
In the United States, “[t]he IARC Monographs . . . have been used
extensively . . . to inform regulatory, legislative, and public health policy
to protect Americans from exposure to potential cancer hazards.”120 The
program “complements other U.S. efforts, often serving as a foundation
for further evaluation or as the impetus for additional research.”121
NCI cancer evaluations, budget documents, and other materials
routinely reference and rely on IARC monographs cancer classifications.122
inapplicable to the discussion infra Section IV.A on whether FACA applies to IARC Monographs working groups. Section 3(2)(A) addresses committees “established by statute or
reorganization plan” and section 3(2)(B) addresses committees “established or utilized by
the President.” See Judicial Watch, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (“The NACC [(North American
Competitive Council)] is subject to FACA regulations if it was ‘established’ or is ‘utilized’
by the DOC [(Department of Commerce)].”).
117
Federal Advisory Committee Act § 3(2)(C).
118
IARC WORKING GROUP, supra note 22, at 9.
119
Pearce et al., supra note 4, at 508. Kurt Straif, the former Head of the Program, has
stated that “[n]ational and international health agencies use the IARC Monographs as
a trustworthy source of scientific information and as the scientific basis for their efforts
to control cancer.” See GRANT APPLICATION, supra note 8, at 6.
120
See Funding Announcement, supra note 49.
121
Email from William Robinson, Off. of Commc’ns & Pub. Liaison, Nat’l Cancer Inst., to
Galen Rende (July 5, 2018) (on file with author). Similarly, the NCI has noted that the
monographs “are considered critical references that inform health policy and cancer
research worldwide about carcinogenic risks to reduce cancer burden globally.” Funding
Announcement, supra note 49; see Request for SPL/BSA Concept Approval, Requests for
Applications (RFAs)/Contracts (RFPs), Limited Competition RFA for the IARC Monographs
for the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans (May 1, 2014) (on file with author) (the
IARC Monographs and their cancer “evaluations are significant both domestically for the
NCI and other US health agencies as well as globally for health organizations worldwide.”).
122
For example, the 2002 IARC Monograph on smoking and cancer was highlighted in
NCI’s cancer research plan and budget proposal for FY 2005 as having “established a
causal association between cigarette smoking and cancers . . . .” NAT’L CANCER INST., U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE NATION’S INVESTMENT IN CANCER RESEARCH 38 (2005),
https://www.cancer.gov/about-nci/budget/about-annual-plan/nci-plan-2005.pdf [https://
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Similarly, “[i]n the Report on Carcinogens, a biannual report mandated by
Congress and prepared by the National Toxicology Program at the NIEHS,
the IARC Monographs are cited throughout their agent evaluations . . . .”123
B.

“established or utilized by one or more agencies”

As discussed in this section, in order for a federal agency to be said
to have “established” an advisory committee, it must form the committee.124
Applying this standard, working groups of the IARC Monographs Program
are not “Government-formed advisory committee[s]”;125 they are instead
created by the IARC Monographs Program staff.126 The IARC staff select
working group participants127 and solicit nominees for working groups
from the general public.128 The NCI, as noted, can recommend members
to serve on working groups, but the NCI does not have veto power over
any of the members selected by IARC.129 The FACA analysis does not end
here, however. The two-prong “utilized by” test of FACA section 3 remains
to be applied.
Although the ongoing cooperative agreement between the IARC
Monographs Program and the NCI has been aptly described as a “partnership,”130 this partnership does not rise to the level by which the NCI
perma.cc/X92N-U9ZD]. IARC Monographs are also frequently cited in NCI’s Tobacco
Control Monograph Series. See Tobacco Control Monograph Series, NAT’L CANCER INST.,
https://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/brp/tcrb/monographs/ [https://perma.cc/WHC2-4MH4]
(last visited Dec. 3, 2019). IARC Monographs are extensively cited as the basis for NCI’s
information on cancer-causing substances. See Cancer-Causing Substances in the Environment, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention
/risk/substances [https://perma.cc/8YM6-SQ2T] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
123
See Email from Ron Johnson, Program Dir., DNA & Chromosome Aberrations Branch,
Div. of Cancer Biology, Nat’l Cancer Inst., to Cherly Walker, Welch Chair & Director, Inst.
of Biosciences & Tech., Texas A&M Health Sci. Ctr. (June 20, 2014) (on file with author). The
email also touts how frequently the IARC website is visited: “The Monographs website is
visited by people from approximately 125 countries and there are more than 150,000 distinct
visitors each year. In 2013, an estimated 70,000 downloads of the List of Classifications (all
agents evaluated by the program and their determined carcinogenicity) were made.” Id.
124
Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 458 (1989).
125
Byrd vs. EPA, 174 F.3d 239, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Byrd cannot show that [the benzene
panel] was ‘a Government formed advisory committee’ as required by our narrow interpretation of ‘established.’ ”).
126
PREAMBLE, supra note 26, at 5.
127
Id.
128
See, e.g., IARC Monographs—Volume 124—Call for Experts, IARC (July 5, 2019), https://
www.iarc.fr/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/QA_Monographs_Volume124.pdf [https://perma
.cc/9FDF-ABHH].
129
See Byrd, 174 F.3d at 249.
130
GRANT APPLICATION, supra note 8, at 5 (“Under the cooperative agreement, the NIH
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“exercise[s] actual management or control over”131 the working groups,
or that these groups are “amenable to [any] strict management by [NCI]
officials.”132 Throughout the cancer classification process, the management of the working groups remains in the hands of the working group
itself.133 The grant application also makes clear that although the relationship between the NCI and IARC should be viewed as a “partnership,”
the NCI “is not to assume direction, prime responsibility, or a dominant
role in the activities.”134 As with the NIH in Animal Legal Defense Fund,
the NCI falls short of satisfying the stringent standard required in the
first prong of the “utilized by” analysis.135 The second prong offers the only
remaining means by which FACA can be said to apply to working groups
of the IARC Monographs Program.
The Court’s sweep of legislative history in Public Citizen led it to
conclude that the phrase “or utilized” expanded the reach of FACA to
apply to advisory committees spawned by an organization considered
“quasi-public” or “semiprivate” because it was created or permeated by
the Federal Government.136 In Animal Legal Defense Fund, the quintessential example of such a quasi-public organization was the National
Academy of Sciences, “created by Congress to answer the government’s
request for investigations . . . and the government takes care of the expenses associated with performing these tasks.”137
Similarly, the U.S. government played a key role in bringing the
IARC into being, which it continues to fund through multiple federal funding streams, and in fostering and funding its Monographs Program since
its inception.138 Indeed, Tomatis has noted that, as a result of the NCI’s financial support, the Monographs Program “has since been able to maintain
an almost constant output of three volumes of monographs per year.”139
purpose is to support and stimulate the recipients’ activities by involvement in and
otherwise working jointly with the award recipients in a partnership role . . . .”).
131
Judicial Watch v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 736 F. Supp. 2d 24, 32 (D.D.C. 2010).
132
Food Chemical News v. Young, 900 F.2d 328, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
133
See GRANT APPLICATION, supra note 8, at 5.
134
Id.
135
Even if NCI’s role mirrors that of the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington Legal
Foundation, in which DOJ exercised significant influence over the advisory committee,
the Court nonetheless held that “influence is not control.” Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S.
Sentencing Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1446, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
136
Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 462 (1989); see Animal Legal Def.
Fund v. Shalala, 104 F.3d 424, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
137
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 104 F.3d at 429.
138
See Pearce et al., supra note 4, at 509.
139
“[W]ith the generous financial support of the National Cancer Institute, the
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And that the “partnership” relationship, which is part and parcel of the
ongoing cooperative agreement, by definition necessarily “closely tie[s]”
IARC and its Monographs Program with the NCI.140 IARC, therefore,
should be characterized as a quasi-public organization, satisfying the
second prong of the “utilized by” analysis.
The cooperative agreement between the NCI and the IARC’s Monographs Program expires in 2020.141 Given the NCI’s unbroken decades of
support,142 another five-year cooperative agreement is likely in the making.
The cooperative agreement provides an effective vehicle in which to include an explicit provision subjecting the IARC Monograph working
groups to FACA requirements.143
CONCLUSION
In 1972, growing concerns about the conduct and sheer number of
federal advisory committees culminated in the passage of FACA.144 Chief
among these concerns was the inaccessibility of committees to public participation and scrutiny.145 Advisory committee proceedings were “unnecessarily closed to the public.”146 FACA’s section 10 was designed to address
this by “establish[ing] the standard of openness in advisory committee
deliberations, and provid[ing] an opportunity for interested parties to
present their views . . . .”147 Openness was to be “liberally construed.”148
The decades old clarion cry for advisory committees to operate in the
full view of the public with limited exceptions applies equally well to the
working groups of the IARC Monographs Program.149 Although FACA was
not intended to cover every conceivable advisory committee rendering advice to a federal agency, its reach extends to advisory groups of quasi-public
program . . . has . . . been able to maintain an almost constant output of three volumes
of monographs per year.” Lorenzo Tomatis, The IARC Monographs Program: Changing Attitudes towards Public Health, 8 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 144, 144 (2002).
140
See GRANT APPLICATION, supra note 8, at 5.
141
Id. at 1.
142
See Pearce et al., supra note 4, at 509.
143
See GRANT APPLICATION, supra note 8. Section III, Terms and Conditions, of the Grant
Award, would be the obvious section in which to require compliance with FACA
requirements.
144
Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. App. 2 (2019).
145
S. REP. NO. 92-1098, at 5–6 (1972).
146
Id. at 5.
147
Id. at 14.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 6.
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entities, entities which the U.S. government “helped bring into being.”150
IARC and its Monograph Program are emblematic of a quasi-public entity, as evidenced by the close and ongoing financial and programmatic
partnership IARC has enjoyed with the U.S. government, through the
NCI and other governmental agencies.151
The recently updated Preamble to the Monographs does not include opportunities for public comment during the working group meetings or opportunities to review any draft Monograph related materials
produced either by the IARC staff or working group members.152 In short,
the working groups remain insular, precisely the ailment that FACA was
meant to cure.153

150

Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 463 (1989).
See GRANT APPLICATION, supra note 8, at 3–5.
152
See PREAMBLE, supra note 26, at 5–6.
153
The 1997 amendments to the Federal Advisory Committee Act limited its application
to the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Public Administration.
Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments of 1997, § 2(a) Stat. 2689. The amendments, therefore, did not address “other entities outside the Federal government [that]
might subsequently be deemed ‘quasi-public’ and thus subject to FACA.” 143 CONG. REC.
H10,578-02, 5 (1997).
151

